Analysis Of Frank Graham s On Racial Profiling - 990 Words

While Mr. Graham s response to racial profiling is understandable, his choice to assimilate validates fears about black people in public places. Graham’s article coupled with the real-life experiences of African Americans as well as articles written about the African American experience in white society all show the futility of African American’s attempts to assimilate into white society. Graham’s actions show that he seems to agree with the popular idea that African Americans are dangerous. Graham’s actions are inappropriate because they validate the fear of black people in public spaces. African Americans are literally demonized by the police, demonstrated when Darren Wilson described Mike Brown as a â€Å"superhuman demon,† and Graham promotes this view of African Americans by making sure his children do not do normal acts like run down the street even though they’re not exercising, carrying a backpack into a store, and even wearing a t-sh irt. By creating these rules, Graham confirms that, when a dark-skinned person of color is not doing these things, they will be in trouble. When Graham states that â€Å"the economic privilege [he] bestowed on [his kids]† would prevent them from being targeted, it shows that he believes that African Americans who are not bestowed with economic privilege should be targeted. Graham’s writes that â€Å"the accoutrements of success† include preppy clothes and â€Å"an air of quiet graciousness.† This is damaging to black people because it goes directlyShow MoreRelatedEssay on Criminological Theories13456 Words   |  54 PagesStudent Study Guide for Ronald L. Akers and Christine S. Sellers’ Criminological Theories: Introduction, Evaluation, and Applications Fourth Edition Prepared by Eric See Youngstown State University Roxbury Publishing Company Los Angeles, California 1 Student Study Guide by Eric See for Criminological Theories: Introduction, Evaluation, and Application , 4th Edition by Ronald L. Akers and Christine S. Sellers Copyright  © 2004 Roxbury Publishing Company, Los Angeles, CaliforniaRead MoreStephen P. Robbins Timothy A. Judge (2011) Organizational Behaviour 15th Edition New Jersey: Prentice Hall393164 Words   |  1573 Pagesand permission should be obtained from the publisher prior to any prohibited reproduction, storage in a retrieval system, or transmission in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or likewise. To obtain permission(s) to use material from this work, please submit a written request to Pearson Education, Inc., Permissions Department, One Lake Street, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458, or you may fax your request to 201-236-3290. Many of the designations by manufacturersRead MoreRastafarian79520 Words   |  319 PagesJamaicans regard as their cultural contribution to the world. Later I will return to these issues and will demonstrate how they contribute to the routinization of Rastafari in Jamaica. The nature of this book dictates a heavy reliance on documentary analysis. My focus is interpretation not ethnography. Therefore, I have not sought to generate primary data on the movement but to analyze and re-analyze the growing body of scholarly and popular literature on the movement, including sociological and anthropologicalRead MoreManagement Course: Mba−10 General Management215330 Words   |  862 Pagescarefully analyze the basic tasks that must be performed and try to devise the work systems that allow their organizations to operate most efï ¬ ciently. The Gilbreths Two prominent followers of Taylor were Frank Gilbreth (1868–1924) and Lillian Gilbreth (1878–1972), who reï ¬ ned Taylor’s analysis of work movements and made many contributions to time-and-motion study.15 Their aims were to (1) break up and analyze every individual action necessary to perform a partic- 26 Jones−George: Contemporary

The Virtues Of Visibility Youtube And Lgbt Youth

The Virtues of Visibility: YouTube and LGBT Youth The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the recent proliferation of positive portrayals of the LGBT community in YouTube videos has had any impact on LGBT youth who struggle with their social identity. This paper hypothesizes that the discourse shaped on YouTube videos surrounding LGBT rights and issues—expressed typically, but not limited to â€Å"coming out† videos, sharing experiences of being a member of the LGBT community, sharing opinions on the political discourse surrounding legislation of LGBT issues, or videos of straight allies who show support for members of the LGBT community (from now on, these videos are described as LGBT friendly)—have made these issues visible†¦show more content†¦Brian Mustanski and Richard Liu’s study elucidated predictors of suicide attempts of LGBT youth (2013). Their study revealed two important findings; first, the strongest predictor of attempt ed suicide was the feeling of hopelessness caused by a lack of social support for the LGBT community, and the stigmatization of gender non-conformity and same-sex attractions (442-5). Second, their study revealed that LGBT youth are twenty-eight percent more likely than heterosexual youth to suffer from mental health disorders such as major depression, conduct disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder—all of which have a strong positive correlation with suicide attempts (447-9). Sociologists Brent Teasdale and Mindy Bradley-Engen conducted a study in 2010 on the role of social support on mental health disorders for adolescent same sex-attractions. Their findings validate the social stress model—a sociological model that argues that mental health disorders are the result of the interplay of stress, lack of social support, and personal efficacy— and reveals that the relationship between same-sex attractions and mental health disorders are the result of elevated stress levels and reduced social support caused by parental or peer rejection (Teasdale and Bradley-Engen 2010, 287-94). This salience ofShow MoreRelatedLgbt19540 Words   |  79 PagesWhat Is LGBT? LGBT stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender and along with heterosexual they describe peoples sexual orientation or gender identity. These terms are explained in more detail here. Lesbian A lesbian woman is one who is romantically, sexually and/or emotionally attracted to women. Many lesbians prefer to be called lesbian rather than gay. Gay A gay man is one who is romantically, sexually and/or emotionally attracted to men. The word gay can be used to refer generally

Apple vs. Nokia in Application Fayol’s Four Management Functions

Question: Discuss about the Apple vs. Nokia in Application Fayols Four Management Functions. Answer: Introduction In any business environment, firms are often seen strategizing on ways to keep ahead of their competitors, basically by enhancing market dominance among other techniques. This concern evokes the very concept of management, which is most definitely the core of any organizations strategies. In this context, this paper will explore the supremacy battle between the two technological giant companies, Nokia and Apple Inc., in which the paper will endeavor to elaborate how the implementation of Fayol's four functions have resulted in notable differences between the two firms. While Nokia is an old giant whose prowess in making smartphones was once irrefutable, the fact that Apple is now far much ahead of Nokia can be purely attributed to strategies in place over the last decade.[1] Technically speaking, in the last quarter of 2009, Apple made more sales out of hardware (smartphones) and software (Appstore purchase and subscriptions), revealing important lessons in the technology business ec osystem.[2] This paper will explicitly highlight the variations in planning, organizing, leading and controlling as in the Fayols model of management, citing possible reasons why the trend reversed in favor of its furious competitor Apple Inc. First and foremost, planning is the most fundamental aspect of progress, and therefore any vicious managerial team would take into account extensive measures to forecast the most suitable course of action. As much as Nokia, the earlier giant having crafted long-term objectivities of staying in the lead, Apple seemed to be more ambitious, from the way they designed their products to the way they embraced innovation. Bob, Brown, a technology enthusiast notes that Apple was about to launch a phone that nobody in the mobile world thought they had much of a chance. The company was just being too ambitious (p.26)[3]. Having noted that Nokia was selling half a billion phones a year before the iPhone, it seemed ridiculous enough for Apple to ever think of reversing the charts without proper planning. [4] While the biggest trick behind the huge success of Apple has been largely pointed to the uniqueness of its products, one cannot ignore the fact that the firm conducted a comprehensive resear ch which ultimately aided the customization of their next-generation technology gadgets. Thus, as much as it is unfit to claim that Nokia did not plan, most consumers widely admit that the latter did not forge sustainable plans including advancing technology and changing customer preferences in both hardware and software.[5] Lastly, Apple is credited for taking consideration of both local and international markets, while Nokia majorly focused on local consumption, which directly translated to wide acceptability and consumer loyalty of the formers merchandise.[6] Conclusively, the rapid advances in Apple products and eventual superiority over the fairly rigid Nokia's masterpiece demonstrate the need for proper planning for businesses. Most importantly, the planning must as well take consideration of competitors and dynamics in the trade. Secondly, leadership, which is loosely defined in terms of quality management and effective planning by the people in authority is as well a vital factor in any organization. In another perspective yet, leadership in terms of market share indicates that both Nokia and Apple have been at the top of the pinnacle of tech products sales.[7] Before Apple overtook Nokia as the maker of the leading smartphone in September 2011, Nokia had been an uncompromised genius for good running years. Taking a keener look into the leadership of Nokia, we see quite a number of flaws that badly ruined the firms performance and lack of vision. Unlike Tim Cook, whose tenure at Apple since Jobs left has been all through inspirational and client-centered, Stephen Elops ill-fated leadership has landed Nokia in bad terms.[8] Any organization that intends to remain steadfast in its place in the market and would first install a cutting-edge management, which runs from the chief executive officer all the way thro ugh all ranks to marketers and public relations departments. As it is widely contested, Elop was inexperienced to make the firm's ends meet, and amid the pressure of competition from Apple, he made the most desperate moves which dragged the company further down.[9] As a sober team leader, Elop could have put to end the galloping brain drain at Nokia in mid-2000s, affected marketing and beefed up the organizational structure to accommodate for the fast leaning technological landscape that largely crippled the firm. In addition, having made the first smartphone before Apple had it on its table, Nokias downfall is unforgivable. Thus, we can attribute the success of Apple over Nokia to the difference in leadership, with the two chief executives of each firm both accountable for the fall and rise respectively. As well, apart from planning and leadership, the organizational structure of a firm plays a central role in its endeavors to succeed. That is why the contrast between Apple and Nokia can be substantially accountable for the differences in their performance especially in the last one decade, where competition has been stiffest. Sadly, Nokia lacks a heart for innovation, and this begins right at the top management.[10] On the contrary, innovation is the culture of Apple's management team. Secondly, corporate management at Apple is designed in a way to allow for easy flow of information, and thus there is no chance for dotted lines of lack of understanding. Just like Steve job's management way back before 2011, the culture of simplicity and well-defined hierarchies have always aided apple to stay afloat.[11] The culture is as well evident from the way the manufacturer releases an item at a time, unlike Nokia whose diversity has been more of a liability than a strength. As much as Nokia' s management is not as much far from Apple in terms of decision-making, it is notable to say that while Steve Jobs was the CEO, he took most crucial decisions by himself and few consultants. Despite being a little risky, it can, however, be advantageous, unlike Nokia's way which calls for broad discussions before reaching finalities. As well, Nokia's command chain has previously exhibited various hitches to fluidity, hindering the process of decision-making which then directly affects productivity.[12] All said and done, Apple's simplicity in its organizational structure has recently placed it a step ahead of Nokia. Lastly, it would be incomplete to consider management minus considering control as a key factor. Being one of the primary functions of management, it hugely involves setting performance standards, measuring performance and consequentially taking corrective measures in a bid to affirm the organizations position in the market. Going straight to the Nokia-Apple duel, the two firms have both effected measures of control in the tech markets. For instance, in 2013, Nokia acquired the Microsoft handset division in a bid to take full control of both software and hardware.[13] Similarly, apple, having previously producing software and hardware solely, insistently refuted attempts to lease the software development to a third party. Far from sales, Apple is well known for keeping a keen eye on the media, always working to have its reputation sparkling (Mac-rumors). With the latest developments in social media, the company is much concerned with the issues raised, and any client will always test ify that it responds aptly to the concerns. This way, it has led the way, with Nokia having ignored that in the first place realizing the niche. In so doing, Apple has achieved better control of users than its competitors. As well, iPhones mp3 players seem to be more interactive than Nokias, enhancing usability and thus likeability.[14] Through similar ways, the tech firm has found its way through Nokias markets. Conclusion In conclusion, it can be drawn that Apple has flaunted Nokia following its keen interest in the four basics of managing practices. Thus it plans, organizes, leads and thus controls more effectively. For instance, Apple has been on the forefront of planning and making sustainable strategies, which has resulted in a double score. On the other hand, Nokia has been more reserved and consequently trailed by the fast-changing environments. Thus, any firm wishing to break the glass ceiling would first take consideration of the four entities of management. Additionally, just like in the above context, any firm in the lead must be able to make well-thought and dynamic strategies that can aid it to survive an onslaught by a younger entrant. Bibliography 9To5Mac. Apple's Rise and Nokia's Fall Highlight Platform Strategy Essentials." Last modified 6:28 am Jul 21st, 2011. https://9to5mac.com/2011/07/21/its-official-apple-beats-nokia-and-becomes-the-worlds-leading-smartphone-maker/ Adam, Harntung. Get Rich, not Lost - Change your planning - Apple, Google v Nokia, Samsung, RIM, Microsoft in Smartphones. Forbes. Last updated 05:27 Nov 23, 2010. https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamhartung/2010/11/23/get-rich-not-lost-change-your-planning-apple-google-v-nokia-samsung-rim-microsoft-in-smartphones/#4e669bbc3beb Bob, brown. "Apple's management team: Before after Steve Jobs left." Network World. No. 14 (2013). 23-28. Haydn, Shaughnessy. "Apple's Rise and Nokia's Fall Highlight Platform Strategy Essentials." Forbes. No. 28. (2013). 24-33. IBS Case Study Development Centre. List of case studies on strategy 1. No.1. (2011) 9-11. Jonathan, Bean. "Bye bye Nokia A failure of management over leadership." Jonobean. Last modified Nov 12th, 2014. https://jonobean.com/2014/11/12/bye-bye-nokia-a-failure-of-management-over-leadership/ Juli, Clover. "Inside Apple's PR Practices, From Media Control to Attitude Shift under Tim Cook." Macrumours. No. 8 (2014). 4-5. Patel, Nilay. Nokia vs. Apple: The In-depth Analysis. EnGadget. No.5 (2010). 38-55. Research Matic. Organizational Culture of Apple and Nokia. No. 5 (2012). 18-29. STL Partners. Apple vs. Nokia: Strategic Lessons from the Smartphone / Appstore Wars In Growing Digital and Telco 2.0. London Penguin, 2011.

The Disadvantages of Homeschooling Essay Essay Example

The Disadvantages of Homeschooling Essay Paper Homeschooling is when pupils are educated at place by parents or coachs instead than go toing public or private school. Many parents home school their kids to maintain them sheltered from the environment and the universe. I believe homeschooling should merely be an option in utmost state of affairss because there are legion disadvantages. The three major disadvantages are the deficiency of resources. the deficiency of forbearance from parents. and the deficiency of socialisation with equals. Students that are homeschooled are non needfully entitled to the resources that pupils go toing public or private school may hold. An article titled â€Å"The Advantages and Disadvantages of Homeschooling† provinces. â€Å"The theory is that schools will hold better books. and the instructors will hold a better instruction than the parent does. and it could function as a disadvantage if the parent is non ready and willing to be the go-to individual for everything. † Teachers. bibliothecs. pupils. and text editions are all considered resources. and most place schooled pupils do non hold handiness to this battalion of resources. This could go a job with the child’s acquisition. I believe it is more effectual if pupils can utilize their equals and other people to better understand what is being taught. and if homeschoolers are being taught by the same individual that is restricting them to one position. Parents besides have to come out of pocket for most of the stuf fs needed for their kid to larn. The cost of these points can besides go a load for the household of a kid that is homeschooled. We will write a custom essay sample on The Disadvantages of Homeschooling Essay specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on The Disadvantages of Homeschooling Essay specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on The Disadvantages of Homeschooling Essay specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer Parents that take on the function as their child’s teacher have to be really patient. Students are easy discouraged when he or she can non get the hang a topic or a specific lesson in school. As a instructor. the parent has to be certain that they do non go defeated because they have to make full their function as the instructor. The article â€Å"The Advantages and Disadvantages of Homeschooling† provinces. â€Å"It is of import that you are able to divide at times the function of parent and instructor. because you will hold to be at that place for your kid in a different mode in times like these. † The major disadvantage is the student’s deficiency of socialisation with equals. Students that are homeschooled should non be wholly separated from society. They should still interact with other childs in their environment ; they should be involved in athleticss and other extracurricular activities. Harmonizing to the article â€Å"The Advantages and Disadvantages of Homeschooling† . â€Å"An inability to socialise good. shyness that comes with non being around other childs and the inclination to work better as an person. instead than in a squad root from this deficiency of association. † Parents who choose to home school their kids to maintain them off from bad influences. are really impeding them from larning how the existent universe truly is. Attending public school will supply acquisition experiences for pupils. which is better than them being ‘told’ about the universe.

Essay Sample on Marriage Couples Who Do Not Get Married

Essay Sample on Marriage Couples Who Do Not Get Married Marriage is the practice by which two people who love each other, create their relationship official, public and permanent. It is the amalgamation of two people in a union that putative lasts until passing away do one part. Marriages are prepared in paradise, but we all want to bring paradise on this earth. Marriage plays an incredibly important role in ones life. According to times magazine life is so swift moving that nobody has time to squander with his or her relatives. Being a human being everyone wants a second heart to share their pains. Wedding is ones delusion, which he or she try to fulfill at-least once in their life span. Logically, when a girl attains a comprehensible age she begins to structure a portrait of her wedding day, the environs they belong to and other wedding parties they attend. In spite of all that, most people are reluctant to the occasion thus preferring to stay together. If you are similar to most people, you ride into married life on dominant waves of love and intimacy that crashed sporadically into self-doubt and apprehension, only to ascend again, stronger than ever. In other words, one understood that you wedded for love. Most marriages come with the responsibility f taking care of children. Men consider themselves masculine and stronger, and are not charged with the responsibility to nurse and take care of children, and women are not comfortable with this (Sullivan, 2007, p. 232). That was the straightforward part. Plenty of research shows that wedding with love is more effective at bringing us together than maintaining us together. It has been found out that in most relationshi ps, women often disagree with the demands of the men, (Sullivan, 2007, p 231). We may have heard the aphorism, weddings are easy, it is difficult to maintain relationships, but the truth is that relationships are tough because a wedding is easy. Strong feelings of any manner transmit an illusion of certainty (Seligson, web). With the exception of bitterness, no emotional experience has more illusion of confidence than wedding. The responsibilities and pressures that come with the marriage and family are fewer these days, than in the past, and thus most people choose not to be tied to them (Sullivan, 207, p. 272). The need to feel persuaded is at least part of the grounds why we come to begrudge the people we love the most. The importance of wedding cannot be judged by the manner the society perceive it, but how deeply an individual craves for it. Since marriage is a long-term union involving two people, this ritual is given its owing importance throughout the earth (Cherlin, 53). Contrasting many one-time occasions, wedding does not cover the comfort of the ent ire community but few persons. Those who contain lethargy towards wedding should understand that wedding across the boundaries does aid a lot in creating concord between two different creed and ethnic group. There is a variety of wide religious doctrines concerning wedding, which reflect a lot on its abiding importance. Apart from portraying a pleasant scale for cementing the bonding among two people, the marriages cover up definite social prospect of the populace. While to some wedding is an underpinning of the organization of society, some considers it mutually a physical and spiritual acquaintance that endures into (Davis, web). Though marriage has lost its grips to many people, in the society, most people choose not to wed. The interested have been vested in the common interest of the couple living together but not necessarily getting married. That is according to the article in the times magazine. There is no contraction agreement that can replace the vows that are exchanged between two people. All other monetary support cannot be graced to replace the glory that dwells in a wedding. The round rings are not just symbols of beauty but a reminder of the lifetime commitment a person makes to the partner. Wedding is not a bylaw but an act of willingness. It is a Voluntary commitment of oneself to someone. Wedding is the best cement of any marriage. A wedding is symbolized by signs like the presence of a wedding ring on a couple finger, but most couples are afraid of the commitment that comes with the wedding (Sullivan, 2007, p. 102).

12 Hilarious ‘Billy Madison’ Quotes

12 Hilarious ‘Billy Madison’ Quotes If you are the kind who cannot tolerate Adam Sandlers over-the-top kind of comedy, stay off this one. Billy Madison is a signature Adam Sandler movie, complete with in-your-face ribald humor. He has the ability to be hilarious in an annoying sort of way. But if you enjoy  movies  that are high on  sexual innuendo, Billy Madison is the right movie for you. Unlike Jim Carrey, Sandler does not rely on goofy antics to draw an audience. He comes across as the funny guy caught between two raging seas. In Billy Madison, Adam Sandler redefines idiot as he portrays Billy Madison. Yet your heart goes out to him because you know that idiotic people are hardly malicious. Billy Madison is a favorite among the younger audience. Kids connect with this child-like adult, who knows and understands the challenges of being a kid.   Read these Billy Madison quotes to understand why kids find this  movie a laugh riot. Billys exaggerated behavior, the weird magazines he reads, and his other silly acts are very enjoyable. Adam Sandlers comic timing in this movie is undoubtedly one of his best. Chris Farley and Norm MacDonald add to the fun. Here are some memorable Billy Madison quotes. PrincipalMr. Madison, what youve just said is one of the most insanely idiotic things I have ever heard. At no point in your rambling, incoherent response were you even close to anything that could be considered a rational thought. Everyone in this room is now dumber for having listened to it. I award you no points, and may God have mercy on your soul.Billy MadisonBack to school. Back to school, to prove to Dad that Im not a fool. I got my lunch packed up, my boots tied tight, I hope I dont get in a fight. Oh! Back to school... back to school... back to school. Well, here goes nothing.​EricWell, sorry doesnt put the Triscuit crackers in my stomach now, does it Karl?Lunch LadyHave some more sloppy Joes. I made em extra sloppy for yous. I know how yous kids like em sloppy.Billy MadisonSometimes I feel like an idiot. But I am an idiot, so it kinda works out.JuanitaIf youre gonna stay home today, you can help me shave my armpits!Billy MadisonI am the smartest man alive!JuanitaOoh that boys a fine piece of work all right. Hes a fine piece of ass though, too.Old LadyWhat is a horseshoe? What does a horseshoe do? Are there any horse socks? Is anybody listening to me?Old Farm LadyIf peeing in your pants is cool, consider me Miles Davis.Brian MadisonYou were brought up with every advantage. I bought you everything. Toys, cars, vacations, clothes...FrankWhen I graduated from first grade, all my dad did was tell me to get a job.

Sales Management Plan - IT company - Background and headings provided Term Paper

Sales Management Plan - IT company - Background and headings provided - WRITE ONLY HEADINGS 7,8,9 - Term Paper Example The sales force that is highly motivated will have more sales. The sales force is also critical in the company’s profitability as it increases sales, maintain prices and control the expenses. Secondly, it is possible to measure and compare the output of an individual. Costs, sales and other result oriented metrics can be tracked by the company. The results of the territory can be benchmarked against the previous year, territory goal, and market potential. The company can; therefore determine the salesperson that is performing better. Also, the job of the sales person involves rejection and lack supportive social interaction. Most of their jobs are unsupervised. Therefore, an incentive payout is a reward and a measure for the success of the salesperson as this job attracts risk takers who require relent incentives for a high level of performance (Andris A. et al. 2001). Incentive plans have impacts that are immediate on the sales force which is felt in either of two ways includ ing it influences the kind of person that is attracted to the organization and also affect the behavior and activities of the salespersons. The compensation framework for a sales incentive has three constituents. First, company that decides on the compensation plan the sales force, which decides on, the compensation plan and the customer who decides whether to take on the products or services of the company. Customer results may include the satisfaction they get from the products and services and also the relationship with the company’s selling organization (Andris et al. 2001). Staffing Recruiting involves finding quality people who can see things through the eyes of the customer and then interface with the people of marketing. To maintain its relevance, it is also important to ensure that the recruited personnel are maintained. There are several skills that may lead to success in sales. These include innate desire to serve, integrity, willingness to listen, strong work ethi c, effective communication skills and ability to put others at ease. The role of the hiring process will involve the location of individuals with core characteristics and the values that lead to sales success. There are six steps important in the hiring process: First is the job definition where the job requirements are developed. Companies have different requirements depending on the industry they are in. these requirements change over time and, therefore, need to reevaluate them and the activity priorities as the market conditions and competition changes (Andris et al. 2001) The second is the candidate profile which should be checked for successful traits of a sales person. A candidate may not have all the required traits, but others are essential and should be present. These include the ability to communicate effectively and a certain level of competence. The third is the applicant pool which determines the quality of the candidate. Recruitment is more successful when the reliabl e information about a candidate is known by the recruiter. The sources of applicants involve Fairs, Web (I.E. Career Builder) and Connect with Career services at Universities. The staff can be recruited either internally or externally. Internal recruiting develops a pool of job applicants that are qualified form the people who are working in the company. This is sometimes referred to as promotion as it is used to motivate employees. This also reduces the start

Counter Terrorism in Iraq Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words - 42

Counter Terrorism in Iraq - Essay Example Later in March 22nd, other three people were killed by suicide car bomber, who detonated the bomb at a checkpoint in Sayed Sadiq. That year only, there were 25 suicide bombings executed by 32 attackers. Approximately 151,000 to 600,000 or more Iraqis were killed in the first 3–4 years of conflict (Reese, 2009). Since then, terrorism has evolved and propagated over a decade up to date. This has compromised the national security of the country, with the instability paving the way for more terrorist recruitment and invasion. Most of these terrorist groups were formed to oppose the US forces that invaded their country on 20 March 2003. They were joined by the United Kingdom, several coalition associates, and the post-invasion Iraqi government. The US also had an objective of destroying Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The dictatorship government was led by Saddam Hussein (Griffin 2004). There are several major terrorist groups, operating in Iraq, that pose a major national security to that nation, with the main one being Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (or Sham or Levant) or ISIS, led by Ibrahim Al-Badri, also known as Al-Baghdadi. They are centered in Syria and Iraq. It is a Wahhabi jihadist extremist militant group, mainly composed of Sunni Arabs from Iraq and Syria. As of March 2015, it has control over a region occupied by 10 million people in Iraq and Syria, and through trustworthy native groups, it has control over small areas of Libya, Nigeria and Afghanistan (Griffin 2004). On 29 June 2014, the group declared itself to be an international caliphate, where it entitles itself religious, political and military authority over all Muslims worldwide (Reese, 2009). The Asaib Ahl-Haq militia is yet another major terrorism group, operating on Iraq grounds.

Perspectives on Free

Perspectives on Free-Speech Zones on College Campuses Essay Naturally, many negative connotations come along with the term â€Å"free-speech zone. † The wording alone automatically insinuates that free speech should not be allowed everywhere, which is hardly the true intention of the idea. Sometimes the right of free speech is taken advantage of; such as in certain rallies and protests, where disruptive noise, violence, and destruction often occurs. Universities hold a responsibility to their students of providing a reasonably safe and undisruptive environment to learn and excel in. Universities are not creating â€Å"free-speech zones† to limit free speech, but rather to maintain a secure atmosphere that is conducive to concentration and higher learning. Universities should be able to maintain a certain level of safety on campus in whatever way they choose. â€Å"The University reserves the right to relocate or cancel the activity due to disruption from excessive noise levels, traffic entanglement, or if the safety of individuals is in question† (West Virginia University’s Student Handbook 91). They are not undermining the right of free speech that we as Americans legally hold, but are creating an appropriate means for demonstrators to voice their opinions without causing unnecessary disruption and chaos in inappropriate places on campus. An issue I do have with this idea of a â€Å"free-speech zone† is that there isn’t a clear definition of when or where these zones should be used. Who is to say whether or not the voicing of a certain opinion or idea requires the use of a â€Å"free-speech zone†? If what constitutes the use of a â€Å"free-speech zone† was better defined then the use of such â€Å"zones† could be more affective and appropriate. As stated by Robert J. Scott, protest zones have been used at many political conventions and other major events. â€Å"Protest zones can be reasonable restrictions that allow free-speech rights to be expressed while decreasing safety concerns and preventing undue disruption† (Scott 92). With the history of violence and destruction that is associated with protests, it is only natural that certain precautions be taken to prevent such problems. It is too vague to say the free expression of views or opinions may not â€Å"disrupt the normal function of the university,† as stated in the West Virginia University’s student handbook. Who decides what the â€Å"normal function† truly is, or when it is being â€Å"disrupted? † If a university decides to establish the use of â€Å"free-speech zones† then they should be able to provide a clear and concise description of when, and for what purpose, these â€Å"zones† should be used. One of a universities top priorities is to make their campus as safe and secure as possible, and if â€Å"free-speech zones† or â€Å"protest zones† are what they feel are necessary to maintain that security then they should be able to enforce them. The problem really comes down to whether or not these â€Å"zones† are used appropriately. If used extensively, and at levels that are unnecessary for the safety of students, then human rights issues could easily come into play. But if used in a smart way, such as for larger demonstrations of freedom of speech, like protests and rallies, then they could be helpful in preventing destruction and/or distraction on university campuses. â€Å"Requiring those expressing dissent to obey the law while doing so does not constitute repression† (Scott 92).

Baby Boomers Essay -- History, Generation X, Generation Y

I believe that all four of the generations in the work place can work together without having any conflicts. Many professional facilities and companies have people of different age groups working together in the same field. There are many articles written by different people who say that studies show that there are many conflicts between the generations, while working together. The four different types of generations are the veterans, the baby boomers, the generation X, and the generation Y. I will talk of all their important characteristics and compare and contrast their qualities based on work ethics, education, and multi-tasking. First of all, â€Å"the oldest generation in the work place is the veterans†. (Tanner, 2011) They were born between the years of 1922 and 1943. They are also known by different names, some of these are: â€Å"greatest generation, loyalists, and the traditionalists†. (Tanner, 2011) People that were born in this generation lived through the great depression and even World War II. â€Å"As a result, this generation values sacrifice, hard work, conformity to rules, and respect for authority†. (Tanner, 2011) The veterans are also very loyal to their employers. The veterans are very big believers in the fact that whatever you do, is what you get out of life. They also believe that â€Å"rewards, status, respect, and authority must be earned†. (Tanner, 2011) Studies have shown that to work most efficient with veterans, make sure that you show them that you admire their experience and respect their thoughts and â€Å"norms of courteous behavior†. ( Tanner, 2011) â€Å"The second oldest generation in the work place is the baby boomers†. (Tanner, 2011) This generation was born between the years of 1943 and 1960. The baby boome... ...r people say that the older generations just want plain obedience. In reality â€Å"everyone wants to be heard, have input and be respect.† (Mueller, 2011) Some older generations complain of Millenials. They say that they just expect to be praised or rewarded just for showing up at work. It is absolutely important to remember that â€Å"generational differences don’t replace individual differences† (Mueller, 2011). It is important for every manager to conduct an interview before hiring any worker. There, the manager can explain to the employee what he is expected to do on the job and also the employee can have the opportunity to ask any questions he may have on the position he is assuming. I really believe that every one of these four generations can work together effectively with just a little patience, respect, and open-mindedness. How many generations do you work with?

Is Pride to Blame in the Antigone Tragedy? Essay

The fate of Creon is sealed by his decision to make an example of his niece, and quickly becomes tragic in Antigone. Creon shows us his lack of leadership skills by creating situations in which he loses the respect of his advisors, and the love of his family. The inability to overcome foolish pride is Creon’s greatest fault and the direct cause of his fall from grace. Initially, the author uses foreshadowing to hint at the upcoming turn of events. Choragos statement during the Parodos â€Å"For God hates utterly The bray of bragging tongues;† warns that no man is above God’s wrath (Sophocles 1327-8). This prediction comes to fruition as the rotting corpse brings disease and wild beasts to Thebes. The deaths of Creon’s family can also be seen as God’s way of punishing him for his foolishness. Additionally, Sophocles uses irony to demonstrate why pride is considered a mortal sin. Creon’s belief that he controls the fate of his loyal subjects is shattered when his son takes his own life, followed by his wife. Only then does Creon realize how his blind fury over Antigone violating his decree has opened his mind to the callous and hurtful behavior he has exhibited. Also, the irony that his blind prophet has better vision than Creon and the Elders reinforces how foolish Creon has been. â€Å"Teiresias, Teiresias, how clearly you saw it all!† shouts Choragos upon learning of the Queen’s suicide (Sophocles 1349). Finally, the setting in the tragedy has strong correlations to how Creon’s perception changes. While amongst his cronies, Creon believes that his will is infallible. â€Å"And the City proposes to teach me how to rule? My voice is the one voice giving orders in the City!† argues Creon to Haimon’s pleadings for Antigone’s life to be spared (Sophocles 1339). However, once the setting moves away from the palace Creon starts to see things a little more clearly. Upon arriving at the tomb which he had Antigone imprisoned, Creon’s evils are unmasked to his eyes, and he now understands all too painfully what his pride has caused. There were many points in which Creon could have changed his decision on Antigone’s fate without losing the respect of his subjects or jeopardize his authority. Although Creon’s advisors, the sentries, and his subjects fear him more than they have ever respected him, crisis could have been averted by showing the kingdom he could be merciful. The image of a strong ruler Creon decided was of the utmost importance turns out to be just an image. So has been the fate of so many before King Creon, and so will be others that follow as long as they cannot overcome themselves. Work Cited Sophocles. Literature: Drama 3. Eds. X.J. Kennedy and Dana Gioia. 10th ed. Boston/NY: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007. 1324-52.

Power and Politics in Organization

Power and Politics in Organizations: Public and Private Sector Comparisons Joseph LaPalombara Wolfers Professor of Political Science and Management School of Management Yale University A chapter for the â€Å"Process of Organizational Learning† section of the Handbook of Organizational Learning, ed. Meinolf Dierkes, A. Berthoin Antal, J. Child & I. Nonaka. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. DRAFT: Please do not cite without author’s permission. Power and Politics in Organizations: Public and Private Sector ComparisonsJoseph LaPalombara Yale University Political Organizations and Their Milieu Organizational learning derives most of its knowledge from research on organizations in the private sector, particularly from the study of the firm. Its rich interdisciplinary quality is reflected in the range of social sciences that have contributed to the field’s robust development. The contribution from political science, however, has been minimal (reasons are s uggested in the chapter on ‘politics’ by LaPalombara in this volume).The mutual failure of political scientists to pay more systematic attention to organizational learning and of organizational learning specialists to extend their inquiries into the public/political sphere is unfortunate in at least three senses. First, a general theory of organizational learning is unlikely to emerge unless and until what is claimed to be known about this phenomenon is shown to be the case (or not) in the public/political sphere as well.Second, sufficient evidence in political science—even if not gathered with organizational learning as the central focus—shows that organizations in the public/political sector do differ in significant ways from those in the private sphere. And third, considerations of power and its exercise are so ubiquitous in public/political-sector organizations, indeed they are so central to an understanding of these bodies, that one wonders why such m eager attention has been paid to this concept in the literature on organizational theory and organizational learning.The present chapter is intended to show that the integration of political science into the field of organizational learning will be improved and that knowledge about organizational learning itself will be deepened if increased attention is focussed on two general questions: What characteristics of organizations in the public/political sector distinguish them from organizations in the private sector? And what are some of the implications of these differences for the overall field of organizational learning?The Normative Dimension The answer to the first question must be that one and perhaps the most salient distinguishing characteristic of public/political-sector bodies is that they are normative at their core. For organizations in the private sector, utility and efficiency are universally accepted as primary values. Theories about them are naturally based on the assum ption that these bodies are organized and behave according to rational principles that reflect these values and not other considerations.This assumption, however, remains so central to writing about management that, as shown below, it actually serves to impede almost any serious attention to power and politics in private-sector, for-profit entities. To be sure, any portrayal of private-sector, for-profit entities as monolithic structures exclusively and rationally oriented to the market and the so-called bottom line is much too stark and oversimplified.Even when this flaw is recognized or conceded, however, organizations in the public/political sector are quite different, so the logic and rationality that may apply to a private-sector body cannot easily be extrapolated to them. These differences are also reflected in the ways in which public-sector organizations relate to the learning process. The fact that they typically carry very heavy and distinctive normative baggage is only on e of many dimensions along which differences may be assessed.Normative considerations are endemic to public/political-sector organizations, first because they are directly or indirectly involved in what Easton (1953) once called ‘the authoritative allocation of values’(p. 129). This phrase is a shorthand way of describing a government’s vast organizational apparatus that engages in a wide range of activities over people. These activities typically include matters over which even the meekest of persons affected will argue and fight with each other, sometimes violently. These contrasts, or differences in preferences (i. e. hat government should do or not do), apply not just to the ends of government but also to the means chosen to bring these ends to fruition. In Lasswell’s (1936) brutally unvarnished observation, politics is about ‘Who Gets What, When, How’. Where organizations are constrained or hemmed in by normative considerations, appeals t o logic and rationality do not travel far or reach many receptive ears. Even when political issues appear to be settled and consensus is reached, say, on the desirability of a given policy, normatively driven questions will arise over the mode or method of policy achievement.Because these policies involve things that happen (or do not happen) to human beings, considerations of expediency and efficiency will often take a backseat to normative ideas about goal achievement. In Etheridge’s (1981) words, such normative matters also raise the issue of ‘what should government learn and what should government not learn’ (p. 86). To put it bluntly, learning things about goal-setting or policy implementation that may be rational and efficient but that are palpably unfeasible politically is not only a waste of resources but also a one-way ticket to political bankruptcy.This and other aspects of public/political-sector organizations to be discussed below make for a good deal of messiness—in organizational boundaries; in the specification of organizational missions and authority; in the functional, territorial, and hierarchical division of labor that relates to policy-making and policy execution; and so on. This messiness cautions against a too-easy extrapolation to the public sphere of agency theory or concepts such as principal–agent relationships. These theoretical frameworks may work quite well for the private sector, where one finds much clearer statements of urpose or of means and ends and where the boundaries demarcating organizations, their authority, and their responsibility are much more unambiguously delineated than in the public political sphere. To cite the most obvious example (see Mayntz and Scharpf 1975, for example), in the public sphere it is not easy to separate, say, the legislature (as ‘principal’) and the bureaucracy (as ‘agent’) for the simple reason that in many circumstances the bureaucrat s not only administer policies but also de facto make policies.In fact, the fabric of public policy-making and its administration is typically a seamless admixture of official and unofficial bodies interacting together in ways that make it next to impossible to distinguish principals from agents. This aspect is in part what I mean by messiness. Other Dimensions of Differentiation. It will help clarify the above exposition if one considers some of the additional dimensions that differentiate organizations in the public/political sphere from those in the private sector. The distinctions drawn are not a matter of black or white but rather one of degree.In every instance, however, differentiation is at least a caution against thinking that differences between the private and public/political spheres are superfluous, misleading, irrelevant, or nonexistent. The dimensions are the organization’s (a) purposes or goals, (b) accountability, (c) autonomy, (d) orientation to action, and (e) environment. Purposes and Goals Political organizations are typically multipurpose. The public policies they are expected to make or administer will often be quite vague, diffuse, contradictory, and even in conflict with each other (Levin and Sanger 1994: 64–8).What governments do is so vast and touches on so many different aspects of organized society that it would be astonishing if these policies did not have such characteristics. Even where single agencies of government are concerned, their purposes, goals, specific marching orders—to say nothing of their procedures and actual behavior—will rarely be coherent or logically consistent. Not only are the mandates of government normally quite vague and diffuse (Leeuw, Rist, and Sonnichsen 1994: 195; Palumbo 1975: 326), they may not be known to many of the people who make up the organizations designated to carry them through.It is not unusual for such organizations to have no goals at all (Abrahamsson 1977), or to have goals that appear to be quite irrational (Panebianco 1988: 204–19; 262–74). For this reason rational-actor models, in which it is assumed that preferences are ‘exogenous’ to the organizations themselves, rightly draw criticism when applied to public/political organizations (Pfeffer 1997). Accountability In the private sector, a timeworn cliche is that those who manage publicly held firms are accountable to their shareholders.As Berle and Means (1933) long ago established, this claim is largely a myth. If the ensuing decades have changed this situation at all, it is only in the influence now exercised over the firm by some of the rather large institutional investors as well as by some stock analysts. Occasionally, even the mass media may influence what a corporation does. The corporate community’s relatively recent references to management’s accountability to stakeholders does not make the publicly held firm similar to public/politica l organizations.In comparison with those who are in public office or who manage governmental and other political organizations, corporate managers live in splendid freedom. Paying attention to stakeholders is, like many other aspects of corporate policy, a matter of management’s choice. In the public/political sphere, accountability to a wide spectrum of individuals and organizations is an inescapable fact of organizational life. People in the public/political sphere who fail or refuse to understand this fact spend very little time there.Public-sector officials, especially those who occupy governmental office, whether appointive or elective, wisely pay attention to and worry about many constituencies, all of which are more or less ready and able to apply sanctions if their wishes or advice are not followed. The vaunted autonomy of the executive branch is much more limited than one supposes (Levin and Sanger 1994: 17). In all democratic systems, what the executive does is subj ect to oversight by legislatures and to challenge in the courts. And the latter two institutions are themselves subject to checks by still others.All of them are under continual scrutiny by outsiders prepared to intervene. In addition, many activities that are considered legitimate, and even praiseworthy, in the private sphere would subject public office-holders to arrest, prosecution, and possible imprisonment were they to practice them (Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson 1987: 60–4). Consider, for example, the public’s quite different reactions to words like ‘broker’ and ‘influence peddler’—or the variety of meanings ascribed to a term like ‘corruption’.As noted by Child and Heavens (in this volume), the universal condition of governmental and other public-sector organizations is that they are subject to constitutions, laws, administrative regulations, judicial decisions, executive orders, and so on. The actions of these pers ons called upon to manage these organizations are constrained by external and internal de facto rules, and limitations (Rainey and Milward 1981). Comparable examples of accountability in the private sector are rare. Public/political-sector organizations are also for more ‘porous’ than private firms are.The former are easily permeated by organized outside interest groups determined to pull these organizations, and therefore their leaders and managers, in different policy directions. The mass media (often the instruments of powerful interests in civil society) also often make quite explicit and sometimes contradictory demands on them. Because these organizations are presumably representatives of the public and are expected to behave in its interest, the press is expected to be especially vigilant on behalf of the public. Above all, public-sector organizations in democracies are subject to the influence of political parties.These parties have their own preference orderings of issues and their own sense of the public policies required to deal with them. Their agendas are essentially normative; rarely do they brook qualification or interference on grounds of efficiency or similar considerations (Gortner et al. 1987: 65–9). Members of governmental organizations, even when protected by civil service laws, defy political parties at considerable risk. This exposure may be extreme in the United States, but it is endemic to European and other parliamentary systems as well. AutonomyThis condition of multiple accountability, formal and informal in nature (Cohen and Axelrod 1984), implies that political organizations are considerably less autonomous than private-sector organizations. Not only are the formal chains of command multiple and complex, but informal influences and pressures often limit, sometimes drastically, the degrees of freedom open to persons in these organizations. Although managers in the private sector are also not free to act exactly a s they might prefer, their organizations (as long as they operate within the law) are immensely more autonomous than public/political sector organizations are.Two additional characteristics relating to autonomy are worth noting. First, not only the goals of these organizations may not only be dictated from the outside, they may also be dependent on other external bodies to achieve them. Lawmakers need the executive branch, as do the courts, to have their policies enforced. Central governments need regional or local governments. A single policy may require the coordination and collaboration of different governmental bodies, many of which are in competition or conflict with each other.And, as I noted earlier, successful goal achievement may in part also lie in the hands of political parties and interest groups. Furthermore, governmental bodies or agencies often disagree about goals and policies. Evaluations of how well or poorly organizations are doing will be driven not by objective criteria (assuming they are available) but rather by political ideology and partisanship. Even within the same government, existing organizations will be in conflict over policies, such as in the case of ministries and departments that spend money while others have to worry about deficits, exchange rates, inflation, and so on.Even in highly authoritarian or dictatorial political systems, such factors make organizations in the public/political sphere, if not radically different in kind from their counterparts in the private sector, then certainly different in the valence of the factors that I have been enumerating. To summarize, the missions of these public/political bodies, their membership, the resources provided for operations, the rewards and punishments for good or bad goal achievement, and often the sheer survival of the organization itself are all matters that typically lie outside the organization itself.Hence, before taking initiatives, persons in political and governmental organizations will make careful internal and external assessments. First, they seek to discover how their superiors or immediate colleagues may feel about a policy or mode of policy implementation. Second, they look to how this policy or mode of implementation will sit with those internal or external forces that can impinge on their professional careers, their economic well-being, or the welfare of the organization itself.Third, they make assessments about what will lie in the way of their ambitions, including, perhaps, their desire to make and enforce given policies. This basic pattern suggests that these organizations are under enormous pressure to engage in learning. Attention will certainly be paid to other governmental agencies, political parties, labor unions, trade associations, religious or ethnic groups, the courts, the mass media, professional associations, the corporate community, and other political and governmental jurisdictions at home or abroad that may affect the org anization’s well-being.The list is very long of constituencies that wield enough power, formal or otherwise, to either dictate or veto certain policies or facilitate or nullify their successful implementation (Dean 1981: 133). Failures to perform calculations of this kind and to learn about these things—and at a reasonably high level of competence—will hobble or defeat the persons or organizations involved. The corporate community has taken to engaging in somewhat similar scanning in recent years, largely because of the internationalization of the firm.When managers extend their operations abroad, they come to appreciate the value, indeed the necessity, of scanning these new environments for aspects that are not, strictly speaking, directly related to the market. As noted above this scanning has also been practiced at home, for national and local governments have come to exercise jurisdiction over matters that affect the life and particularly the profit or loss of private enterprise. One can generalize this tendency by noting that managers are increasingly impelled to engage in scanning whenever gaps begin to appear between a corporation’s policies and its actual performance.Failure to catch sight of such gaps before the media do can carry severe consequences. Orientation to Action The conditions described above do not encourage much initiative by public/political-sector organizations. Action tends to be reactive, not proactive, and prophylactic, not innovative. Fresh ideas are typically viewed as threats to a delicate equilibrium between internal and external forces. Few people wish to risk taking steps that might trigger chain reactions with unknown consequences.Conservatism, not risk-taking, becomes the modal orientation to action. Persons in the private sector, and the mass media, lament attitude, sometimes stridently. They overlook, perhaps, that they themselves are partly responsible for the shortcomings that they criticize. C onservatism also grows out of the fact that these organizations are much more tied to tradition and more deeply institutionalized than is true in the private sector. These traits, too, make them extremely resistant to change.Whether legislatures (Cooper 1975), political parties (Panebianco 1988), or bureaucratic agencies (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1995) are meant, the length of time they have been around will greatly condition what the organization is capable of doing, including its capacity to learn and, on this basis, to change. Max Weber’s (1958) reference to bureaucracy’s ‘dead hand’ (p. 228) suggests that this type of conservatism is brought about by the very same characteristics that he associated with legal-rational authority systems.Some writers have labeled this phenomenon ‘strong institutionalization’ (Panebianco 1988: 53). Others have called it the embeddedness of values, or norms, that affect the cognitive systems of organiza tions (Herriott, Levinthal, and March 1985), the governmental sphere, therefore, endless examples show that efforts to reform these organizations fail more often than not (Destler 1981: 167–70). This pattern does not mean that the bureaucrats who run these organizations are beyond anyone’s control or that change is impossible (Wood and Waterman 1994).It does mean, however, that organizational change is extraordinarily difficult to carry off, given the magnitude of inertial forces (Kaufman 1981). The budget process and goal displacement in the public/political sphere are additional factors that impinge on an orientation to action. For instance, not only are public budgets controlled from outside the organizations that depend on these allocations, in the short and medium terms, they can be modified and redirected only minimally, and at the margins. This circumstance is one reason why political scientists who wish to identify the most powerful groups and organizations, wi thin government tself and within civil society, will profile public budgetary allocations over fairly long periods of time. Goal displacement occurs when the personal interests and expediency of organizational leaders and members come to dominate and replace the purpose(s) of the organization itself. This tendency is ubiquitous in the political sphere. Cooper (1975) nicely summed it up in his observation on the U. S. Congress: He found that institution ‘quite vulnerable to the deleterious effects the pursuit of residual goals [of its members] involves. These self-regarding goals] distort policy orientations and block institutional reforms by making individual self interest or collective partisan advantage the focus of attention and the criterion of action’ (p. 337). Mayhew (1974) found that the best explanation for the action orientation of members of Congress is the strength of each member’s the desire be reelected. In extreme form, and in many different types o f organizations, these characteristics actually result in a transformation of the organization itself (Perrow 1972: 178–87).The Environment Because the environment of organizations in the public/political sphere is so strongly normative, the policies enacted there are not only temporary but also contested in their implementation every step of the way both inside and outside government. Knowing about these aspects of their environment, the managers of public/political organizations engage in a predictable type of environmental scanning and learning. For example, they learn whether to pay more attention to the legislature or to the executive office (Kaufman 1981).In order to be at least minimally effective in their environments, the organizations involved must learn the ways and means of overcoming the kinds of constraints that I have been summarizing (Levin and Sanger 1994: 66–8, 171–6). Indeed, considerations of organizational efficiency may be and often are ent irely irrelevant to decision-making and choice in the political sphere. Successful ‘entrepreneurs’ in this context are the ones who learn how to survive and/or help their policies survive in an environmental landscape full of dangerous surprises and subject to frequent and radical change.The basic knowledge to be internalized is that this struggle will remain continuous and that space for freedom of action will not last long. It is these qualities—ambiguity, messiness, and continuous struggle and conflict—in the political and governmental environment that lead political scientists to give considerable attention to power and its distribution both among and within organizations. That attention remains intense, notwithstanding that power is an elusive concept invariably laden with all sorts of normative claims about to what type of power is legitimate and what type is not.In political science there is fairly broad agreement (Dahl 1968) that power is the abili ty, through whatever means, of one to person make another do his or her bidding, even and particularly in circumstances in which doing so is not what the other person wishes or prefers. Power and Organizations The Role and Anatomy of Power Struggles Power, and the struggle over it, describe the essence of the political process. Rothman and Friedman (in this volume) note that scholars writing on organizational learning rarely take conflict and conflict resolution into consideration.They add that organizational conflict, even in the hands of authors as skilled as March and Olsen (1976), is not mentioned as one of the factors that may inhibit the successful development of a learning cycle (see also March 1966). This neglect stems in part from the tendency, widespread in both the corporate community and management literature, to consider conflict itself as something highly undesirable and potentially pathological and, therefore, as something to be defeated (Hardy and Clegg 1996: 627â₠¬â€œ8; Pfeffer 1981: 2–9).It cannot be without negative consequences, either for the theory of organizational learning or for attempts to apply it in the workplace, that such organizations are almost never studied from the vantage point of power and of the competition that takes place to create and maintain control of it or wrest it from others (Berthoin Antal 1998; Dierkes 1988; Hardy and Clegg 1996: 631). One author (Kotter 1979: 2) noted that the open seeking of power is widely considered a sign of bad management.Indeed, the authors of management literature not only skirt the behavior associated with power struggles but also condemn it as ‘politicking’, which is seen as parochial, selfish, divisive, and illegitimate (Hardy and Clegg 1996: 629). Kotter (1979) found, for example, that in 2,000 articles published by the Harvard Business Review over a twenty-year period, only 5 of them included the word ‘power’ in their titles. This finding is astound ing. It suggests that power is treated like a dirty little family secret: Everyone knows it’s there, but no one dares come right out to discuss it.One might imagine, though incorrectly, that the situation has changed for the better in recent decades. An examination of the Harvard Business Review with Kotter’s same question in mind shows that only 12 of more than 6,500 articles published in the period from 1975 to mid-1999 contained the word ‘power’ in their titles and that 3 contained the word ‘conflict’. ‘Leadership’ appeared in nine titles. In a sample of abstracts of these articles, one finds, as expected, the term ‘power’ somewhat more often than in the article’s titles.But the term is almost never treated as a central concept that orients the way the researcher looks at an organization or develops propositions about its internal life. This finicky, keep-it-in-the-closet attitude toward power is puzzling. F or political scientists, the question of power in organizations is central for many reasons: because power is held unequally by its members, because there is a continuous struggle to change its distribution, because these inequalities and efforts to change them inevitably lead to internal tensions.A persistent quest in political science, therefore, is to illuminate the structural aspects of public/political management that permits those involved to confront and handle power confrontations without defeating the purpose of the organization itself. Is There a Power Struggle? The puzzle of inattention to power in the fields of organizational theory and organizational learning is all the more intriguing given that leading organizational theorists, such as Argyris and Schon (1978, 1996) and Perrow (1972), have certainly addressed this matter.For example, Perrow treated organizational traits such as nepotism and particularism as means by which leaders of economic and noneconomic organizati ons maintain their power within them. Because these organizations are the tools of those who lead them and can be used to accumulate vast resources, a power struggle typically occurs over their control (pp. 14–17). And because of goal displacement that may accompany such power struggles, organizations may well become ‘things-in-themselves’ (pp. 188–9).It is possible that leading theorists such as Argyris and Schon (1978, 1996) and Senge (1990) have themselves been excessively reticent in treating phenomena such as power struggles within the firm (Coopey 1995). It may be that corporate managers are in denial and therefore loathe to acknowledge that even they, like their counterparts in politics, are playing power games. Firms, and the literature about them, stress the beauty of teamwork and team players. Plants are organized around work teams and quality circles. Mission statements are endlessly reiterated.Human resource managers expend enormous energy inst illing the firm’s culture as a distinctive way of doing things. People who excel at the approved traits are rewarded with promotions and stock options. All these practices might be cited as evidence that corporate behavior is instrumentally rational and that the search for power, especially for its own sake, is alien to the firm. This way of thinking and describing things leaves little room for attention to the power games that lie at the center of most organizational life.Thus, making decisions about corporate strategic plans and the budgetary allocations that go with them; defining of core businesses and the shedding of what is not ‘core’; effecting mergers, acquisitions, and alliances; and carrying out radical corporate restructuring that may separate thousands of persons from their jobs and yet dazzlingly reward others would typically be seen by political scientists as behavior that is quite similar to the kind of power struggles that take place every day in public-sector organizations.Behind the veil of corporate myth and rhetoric, managers obviously know about this aspect of their environment as well. So do writers for the financial newspapers, where words such as ‘power struggle’ appear much more frequently than they do in the management journals. How could it be otherwise when the efforts at leveraged buyouts, struggles to introduce one product line and abolish others, and differences over where and how best to invest abroad take on the monumental dimensions reported in the press?It would be astonishing if the persons involved in these events were found to actually believe that considerations of personal and organizational power are not germane to them. Nevertheless, as Hardy and Clegg (1996) noted, ‘the hidden ways in which senior managers use power behind the scenes to further their position by shaping legitimacy, values technology and information are conveniently excluded from analysis. This narrow definition o bscures the true workings of power and depoliticizes organizational life’ (p. 629). Attempts to correct the queasy orientation to the reality of conflict and power struggles have been relatively rare.One reason is that not just the actors in the corporate community but also students of such things come to believe in the mythologies about empowered employees, concern for the stakeholders, the rationality of managerial decisions, and the pathology of power-seeking within organizations. Their belief is a pity in that, without doubt, the structure of power, explicit or implied rules about its use, and the norms that attach to overt and covert power-seeking will deeply affect the capacity of the organization to learn (Coopey 1995).In any case, there can be no doubting the fact, however much it may continue to be obscured in the corridors of corporate power, that struggles of this kind deeply affect corporate life its external behavior; and who gets what, when, and how within these institutions (Coopey 1995: 202–5). The Benefits of Power Struggle Power struggle, of course, is not the only aspect of organizations worth study, and the world of politics is not just Hobbesian in nature. Cooperation is the obverse of conflict.How power is defined and whether the definition reflects left-wing or right-wing bias makes a difference in thinking about or conceptualizing the salience of power in organizations (Hardy and Clegg 1996: 623–5). In particular, it is essential that one avoid any definition or relatively broad conceptualization that does not take into account that, in any organization the existing ‘rules of the game’ even if they are considered highly rational and ‘legitimate’, constitute in themselves the outcome of an earlier (and typically ongoing) struggle over control of an organization’s resources (Hardy and Clegg 1996: 629).When the ubiquitous existence of power struggle within organizations is acknowledged and put into proper perspective, when power-seeking (even when the impulse is entirely ego-centered and not driven by organizational needs) is accepted as normal behavior, and when it is recognized that no existing organizational structure is entirely neutral, only then can one hope to clarify what kind of single-loop or double-loop learning is likely to occur.For example, Coopey (1995) argued, correctly in my view, that where the distribution of power within an organization is hierarchical and asymmetrical, the type of organizational learning that proceeds in such contexts will tend to buttress the status quo. Their reasoning makes sense not just because, for example, the learning process tends to favor senior managers but also because the kind and quality of information to which those managers have access becomes, in itself, an instrument for exercising and preserving one’s favorable position in the power hierarchy.In the public sector, double-loop learning is even more imp eded and therefore rarer than in the private sphere. The reason is that politics, in both the organizational environment and political organizations, actually infuses every aspect of what public-sector organizations are and what they do. The more important the sphere of action or the issues treated by these bodies and the more public attention they draw, the more difficult it will be to reach consensus.And once consensus is reached, the more improbable it will be that anyone will either want to modify it or succeed in doing so—no matter what the feedback about the policies and their efficacy may turn out to be (Smith and Deering 1984: 263–70). Double-loop learning in the public sphere is impeded also by the formal separation of policy-making and policy implementation, as for example between legislative and administrative bodies. As noted earlier, policies are infrequently the choices of the organizations called on to implement them.In this setting, endemic to governmen tal systems, certain types of impediments to organizational learning tend to materialize. On the principal’s side, there may not be sufficient time, or technical competence, or interest to learn what is actually going on with policy implementation. The probability is low, therefore, that those who make policy and set organizational goals will ever get information that might encourage a realistic articulation of goals and a rational specification of the means to be used in goal achievement.Organized interest groups are well aware of this gap. As a consequence, their typical strategy is to keep fighting for what they want, not only when alternative policies are up for consideration but also (sometimes particularly) after an unwanted policy has formally been adopted but must still face the vagaries of being carried out. On the agent’s side, whatever is learned about policy implementation that might urge a change of methods or of the policy itself may never be articulated at all, for to do so might upset an existing political equilibrium.Not only are these equilibria difficult to obtain in the first place, they often also involve an unspoken, symbiotic relationship—often dubbed the ‘Iron Triangle’ (e. g. Heclo 1978: 102)—between a specialized legislative committee, a bureaucratic agency responsible for administering the specialized policies, and the organized interests that benefit from particular policies, particular ways of implementing these policies, or both. Potential learning that would upset this balance of forces finds very rough sledding.The treatment of whistle-blowers, who sometimes go public with revelations of misguided or distorted policies or of bad methods used in their administration, is eloquent evidence of this problem. One way to overcome the stasis implied by these tendencies is to encourage power struggles, not to obscure them (Lindblom 1971: 21–42, 64–7). Nothing will galvanize the atten tion of politicians and bureaucrats more than learning that organized groups with a vested interest in a given policy and large numbers of faithful voters are unhappy about a particular aspect of public policy.When these groups lie outside the Iron Triangle, they are far less inhibited by considerations of equilibria then when they are inside it. This single-issue focus is indeed one of the reasons why even small and not well-financed public advocacy groups can sometimes be very effective in bringing about change (Heclo 1978). The trick is to maximize transparency, to encourage more group intervention as well as prompt the media to provide more, and more responsible, investigative reporting than they usually offer.Today it appears that the Internet is quickly becoming an important instrument for the timely, accurate, and detailed exposure, now on a global scale, of conditions that require correction. The organizational learning implications of this development are potentially enormo us. Increased transparency implies, if nothing else, a more democratic, capillary diffusion and sharing of information (see also Friedman, Lipshitz, and Overmeer in this volume).In an organizational context, whether in the private or the public sphere, this fact alone modifies the form, quality, and spread of learning; it also brings about a modification of the organizational power structure itself. Such modifications also mean that the structure and configuration of conflict will change. In political science this kind of transformation, which widens and deepens competition, is considered to have healthy implications for the overall political system in which competition takes place.That is, benefits are expected to derive from the fact that the ‘market’ becomes, in comparison to the more dirigiste state, more Smithian, less concentrated, and less dominated by a handful of competitors who, rhetoric aside, rarely pursue the general welfare but rather much narrower conside rations. At the very least, increased transparency and the broadening of the competitive sphere clearly require that political managers develop a set of skills that permit them to meet such challenges and function well within these constraints.New Signals from the Private Sector Something similar to this attitude about encouraging conflict may be developing in the private sector. Gortner et al. (1987) lamented that theories of the organization ‘simply do not deal with the issue of politics, and . . . [that these theories] interpret power as an internal phenomenon usually related to the area of leadership’ (p. 76). But change may be afoot in this respect for at least two reasons.Contributors to this volume as well as writers such as Pfeffer (1981, 1997), Coopey (1995) and Hardy and Clegg (1996) may well succeed in their efforts to raise self-consciousness and broaden and refine theories of the organization and organizational learning to include attention to power and pol itics. Second, variations and abrupt changes in the environment of business are ubiquitous today and likely to intensify tomorrow. It could not be otherwise in an era of globalization of the firm, in which, more than ever before, firms venture into a wide variety of cultural settings.In addition, managers increasingly come from a wide variety of cultures and professional backgrounds where values and norms are not necessarily carbon copies of each other. An organization’s capacity to read signals about politics and power distributions, outside as well as inside the firm, and to make quick, constructive adaptations to them will represent not just a luxury but also a necessary condition for establishing a competitive advantage in the global marketplace.In limiting cases, this capacity may actually become a necessary condition for survival. Power-driven behavior within the firm not only is endemic to such organizations but remains salient irrespective of the degree to which the f irm succeeds in creating an internal environment that is homogeneous, harmonious, and collaborative—an environment peopled by those who share corporate values and a corporate culture and who stress collective over individual goals (Handy 1993: 123–49).By definition, the firm is typically an organization that places high value on the competitive spirit. That spirit is an aspect of human behavior everywhere and that can scarcely be divorced from the impulse to obtain and hang on to disproportionate shares of power. Improved understanding of the structure of such internal competition also illuminates the relationship between these kinds of patterns and corporate learning (Coopey 1995: 197–8; Hardy and Clegg 1996: 633–5; Kotter 1979: 9–39).Increased attention to power (even if the term itself is not used) is implicit in the corporate community’s recent encouragement of internal open expression of objections to existing policies and of open compe tition between units of the company and between its members. Bringing these universal underlying conditions to the surface may be inevitable, given how much more variegated today’s large-scale companies are from those in the past, not just in technology, product lines, and personnel but above all in the great diversity of markets and cultures in which they now operate.The less homogeneous the international firm becomes, the more difficult it will be to mask the fact that corporate life, like political life, involves a good deal of organizational and individual struggle over power. Power Linkages and Networks Because conflict and power struggle in public-sector organizations are both internal and external, their managers are impelled to search the environment for opportunities to form alliances. Sometimes such alliances are of the Iron Triangle variety, but they are certainly not limited to this form. The idea is to create structural linkages that will improve one’s cha nces of prevailing.As public policies become more salient for the firm, the firm too, will experience increased need to expand its own networks beyond those that already exist in the marketplace. Linkages with public bodies, for example, cannot be optimized (as once may have been the case) through the use of consultants and lobbyists. Structures and capabilities consonant with the establishment of direct networks come to replace or supplement these older approaches. Multinational corporations that operate abroad, where public policies represent new risks for the firm as well as new opportunities as well, have often moved in exactly this networking direction.One indicator of this change is the proliferation not just of equity joint ventures (as opposed to the once-dominant fetish of the wholly owned subsidiary) but also all manner of other interfirm alliance, designed to optimize, in overseas local markets, the use of firms and their managers who have extensive experience there. In t he case of U. S. companies, this type of change was also spurred by the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act a generation ago. At home, one immediate consequence of this legislation was a sharp increase in the number of in-house attorneys employed by American firms.Overseas, it led to a much more intense search for the ways and means of finding arrangements that can somehow enable overseas U. S. firms to engage in corporate behavior that was unexceptional abroad but suspect or even outright unacceptable at home. The globalization of enterprise, the growth of networks in which the firm becomes involved at home and abroad, also brings about a considerable extension of learning methods and horizons, if not a new type of organizational learning in the private sector. The international firm becomes more sensitized to power configurations and power equilibria.The search is broadened as well as intensified in order to identify aspects of the environment that might impinge on corpor ate success. The quality of intelligence relevant to business operations at home and abroad is improved, as is the knowledge about the location and means of access to points in the decision-making process that relate to public policies affecting the foreign investor. A keen sense that each environment has its unique aspects as well as dimensions that are general to any environment impels the firm to sharpen its analytical instruments and thereby try to improve its learning.Efforts to create a total quality system come to include not just the production, distribution, and servicing of a firm’s products but also the firm’s ability to recognize power and power struggles for what they are and to attune its learning methods to profit from this new capability. Types of Power Distributions and Equilibria Although power equilibria are never permanent, they tend to last for a long time. The reform of governmental bodies tends to be greatly resisted because, even when reforms ar e relatively mild, they threaten existing equilibria (Seidman 1977).As a rule, unless quick and deep change is the goal, it is better for an organization (inside or outside the public/political sphere) to learn how to operate within an existing equilibrium than to make efforts to change it. Indeed, it is almost axiomatic that, where a radical departure in public policy is intended, creating a new organization is far preferable to seeking achievement of these new goals through the existing system (Levin and Sanger 1994: 172–3).Events of this kind, though rare, provide highly fluid opportunities to achieve first-mover advantages as new networks and a new equilibrium are established. In this regard, it makes a difference whether the overall configuration of the political system is monocratic or pluralist, unitary or federal, highly centralized or characterized by broad delegation or devolution of powers. That is, power equilibria at the microlevels will be influenced in no small measure by the configuration of the larger system in which these equilibria are embedded.Pluralism Pluralist systems tend to maximize not only the number of individuals and organizations able to intervene in the policy-making and policy implementation processes but also the number of channels through which the interventions occur. Pluralism implies minute and fragmented representation of interests. The underlying assumption is that equality of opportunity, central to democratic theory, should also apply to the policy-making process. It will obviously make a difference which groups prevail in these efforts to exercise influence.It is equally important whether and what kinds of groups can bring some order to the process by aggregating a number of small groups under a single organizational umbrella. Pluralism also invites much debate. In theory, when consensus is achieved, it is expected to be very strong, precisely because of widespread opportunities that interested parties have for being consulted and hearing the views of others. Again in theory, this system of broad participation should also optimize the discovery both of best solutions and of innovative ideas about public policies and how best to achieve them.It is behind such policies, according to pluralist democratic theory, that one can expect the strongest collective effort to emerge. And given all of these assumptions, consensual policies are likely to be well administered and widely accepted as long as they achieve expected aims. Within this rich mosaic of interactive participation, organizational learning is presumably optimized, as are the efficacious making and implementation of public policies. There are also negative sides to pluralism, and they are well known to organizational theorists.A plethora of communication channels easily degenerates into information overload. This overload in turn can lead to never-ending debates that wind up in stalemates or paralysis. There may be too much talk, too m any options raised, and little inclination, or indeed ability, to reach closure. An even more notable objection to this mode of decision-making is the raised probability that it will produce only lowest-common-denominator outcomes. The need to balance competing forces and to find acceptable compromises implies that only in extreme emergencies can pluralist systems adopt radical measures.Pluralism and the forceful, timely management of issues do not sit easily side by side. Hence, it seems valid to presume that such systems will not work well within a corporate structure that, almost by definition, is expected to be hierarchical and unitary (Hardy and Clegg 1996: 622–6). Monocratic and Unitary Systems Monocratic and unitary systems are highly centralized. If they permit a broad representation of interests, it is likely to be within a framework that is much more disciplined than that of pluralist systems.Monocratic and unitary systems are able to act even when broad consensus m ay be wanting or impossible to bring about. Participation from the ground up, so to speak, is not so loose or permissive as to actually tie the hands of or paralyze those at the center. Compared to pluralist systems, monocratic arrangements tend to be less democratic (not to be confused with undemocratic). They may involve broad, well-articulated participation in policy-making and implementation, but within limits.They tend to be more intolerant of inputs that are judged to be dysfunctional. They are immensely more suspicious of interventions in the formal decision-making and policy implementation process by groups and organizations that are not official, or not officially approved by the government. The tensions between pluralistic/democratic and unitary/monocratic arrangements are not unlike those found within corporations that move in the direction of empowerment of those located toward the bottom of the pyramidal hierarchy.As I have suggested, this pyramid is not just one of pos itions and authority but also of command and control. That is, as long as the pyramid remains a pyramid, even slightly, it is a power arrangement governed by rules that, with rare exceptions, are themselves the outcome of a power struggle. Serious efforts to empower persons who have not had very much power, or who through empowerment will come to exercise more of it than in the past, clearly imply a widening and deepening of participation in decision-making both in the making of corporate policies and in their implementation.It is no wonder that changes of this kind, as well as those designed to bring stakeholders meaningfully into such processes, are fraught with complications and that they usually degenerate into not much more than lip-service platitudes (Coopey 1995). Monocratic and unitary political systems, such as those typically found in Europe and elsewhere outside the United States (and to some extent outside Great Britain), accord very high status to the state writ large. Those who manage the state are more inclined to redirect, minimize, and, if necessary, override interference from civil society when this interference threatens to paralyze government.Reasons of state, as the justification is often called, will lead to closure of debate and then to public action, presumably in favor of the community as a whole. In monocratic systems, popular sovereignty and broad participation by the masses or by organized groups will not be permitted to place the state and its overriding welfare at risk. This attitude is similar to the posture of senior corporate managers who are scarcely about to tolerate modes of empowerment or participation that might cast serious doubt on the company’s mission, the rationality of its basic long-term strategy, or the company’s very survival.Nevertheless, in the corporate sphere, as in the sphere of the state, the powers available to managers must be and often are used to end an aura of legitimacy not just to existi ng rules and policies but also to the outcomes that derive from them (Hardy and Clegg 1996: 630). Federalism Federalism adds another facet to this discussion. As a political concept that stands in opposition to that of unitary structures, federalism implies a division of power on the basis of territory.A much-touted advantage of federalism is that it permits the bringing together, under one central authority, of territorial units that differ quite markedly from each other in many ways. This would include, say, the size of their population or territory; their racial or linguistic make-up; and a wide range of social, economic, and even political conditions. Federal systems represent ways of organizing and managing diversity. In the realm of politics, experience has shown that these systems are therefore much more viable means of managing large nations than are highly centralized unitary systems.In fact, most of these nations are of the federal, not the unitary, variety—even the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China in their so-called totalitarian heyday. Federalism also maximizes the amount of experimentation (with different laws, institutions, electoral arrangements, administrative organizations, and the like) that can take place under a common political roof. This umbrella-like structure permits, indeed encourages, the search for best practice in institutional form and relationships and in policy-making and implementation. This feature of federalism encourages, permits, and, indeed encourages self-conscious learning.In the United States, for example, there are formal organizations designed to provide the individual states and major cities with information about the potentially innovative or effective approaches that each may be taking to, organizational procedures or public policy. Similar information-sharing institutions also exist at the international level. This institutionalized learning is designed in the broadest sense to raise th e quality and lower the cost of governmental services. In a federal setting the political center shares a number of powers with other territorial units. Except in estricted areas, it cannot pretend to be the exclusive holder or exerciser of power and authority. Even where in formal terms the political center’s authority may be exclusive and where policies are expected to be uniformly administered throughout the system’s territories and subunits, considerable local variation must be permitted. Unitary systems, by contrast, permit much less flexibility of this type. The central authority within such systems exercises nearly exclusive authority to make system-wide policies, and it is also expected that these policies will be uniformly administered everywhere.Any deviation from centrally established policies, indeed any policy-making within subnational units, proceeds only with some sort of authorization by the center. As often said in France, if one wishes to know exactly what children might be doing at a certain hour of any school day, it is sufficient to consult the manual issued by the appropriate ministry in Paris. The unitary form is highly analogous to the world-wide business firm, including firms organized by product group or division, in which authority and control are concentrated in a single, central organization.The preceding, post-war development of the multinational corporation, at least in the United States, proceeded for the most part on the basis of this model. It was thought that the revolutions in jet travel and electronics made such centralized control both desirable and feasible. That is, these changes in the speed and facility of travel and communication were said to make possible the global extension of the so-called Sloan model of the corporation, a model that had worked so well within the United States.Feedback and Learning No matter whether the basic structure is pluralistic or monocratic, federal or unitary, the need for fe edback from which the center can presumably learn is universal. Federal systems, because they produce many streams of information, may be more open but less efficient than unitary systems. Unitary systems, although in theory narrower and easier to control than federal systems are in terms of information-producing channels, are at high risk of having information delayed, distorted, or misdirected.It is apparent, however, that the center often deludes itself into believing that, with a highly disciplined and centralized organizational weapon at its disposal (like the Communist party under Stalin in the USSR or the Chinese Communist party under Mao), it can both learn and control what transpires at the periphery (Hough 1969). The fallacious assumption in this instance is that a centralized and highly disciplined organizational instrument, such as the Communist party, can prevail irrespective of whether the overall system is of the federal or unitary configuration.Pluralism and Federali sm in the Firm? A pluralist and federal model of the polity ill fits the generally held image of the firm and of other private-sector organizations. Decision-making of the kind represented by the typical firm can scarcely follow a pluralist model to the letter, at least not without a rethinking of a great many well-established notions of what a world-scale company should be and how it should be run. Within the firm great emphasis is placed on clear lines of authority, both horizontal and vertical.The global firm still tries to instill a single corporate culture so that the hierarchy of values, the operational norms, and the modus operandi will be essentially the same wherever its branches and units may be located. This model leaves little room for pluralist inputs and local diversity. Pluralist democracies and federal systems thrive (most of the time) on their multicultural dimensions. Rather than eliminate diversity, it is honored and encouraged. In the corporate world, much of wha t is claimed about decentralization, ‘planning from the bottom up’, and individual empowerment often is spurious.Senior managers in the corporate world are rarely able or inclined to practice the decentralization or the broad and deep participation that they may preach. More often than not they use the considerable powers at their disposal not to encourage debate that leads to consent but rather to mobilize consent itself (Hardy and Clegg 1996: 626). In the public/political sector, a key test of how seriously the center wishes to encourage diversity and favor empowerment lies in the practice of devolution, as opposed to decentralization.Devolution, typically practiced on a territorial basis, substantially reduces the powers of the center over the periphery, sometimes drastically. The strongest indicator of this reduction is the empowerment of the periphery not only to make policies but also to tax or otherwise raise capital in connection with these policies. Such transf ers, in turn, encourage high levels of competition between the subnational units of federal systems, sometimes creating very difficult problems at the center.Devolution increases pluralism. When hierarchy is replaced by something composed of rather free-acting units, managers need to develop skills that are germane to these changed circumstances. It is one thing when a person’s position makes it possible to mobilize consent and conforming behavior; it is quite another story when both of these things must be generated within the context of a relatively open, participatory, and fluid system of reaching consensus on what should be done and how best to do it.It is possible that the globalization of enterprise will force an increase in genuinely federal arrangements on the firm, a shift that would certainly imply moving away from a strict unitary, hierarchical model and award one that is genuinely more participatory, even if more difficult to manage. Charles Handy (1996) stated th at such a change may be taking place (pp. 33–56), although even he suggested that the application of federal principles to the corporate world will, perhaps inevitably, be imperfect (pp. 109–12).The creation of similar federal structures, even ones remaining distant from devolution, requires a new look at many of the most canonical ideas about how best to organize and manage the profit-seeking enterprise. On close inspection, the sometimes spectacular downsizing and other changes in corporate structures since about 1990 do not appear to have brought about radical operational changes in hierarchical structure. In both the public and the private sectors, centralized control of organizations dies hard.Nevertheless, the federal thrust in many of today’s global firms should not be underestimated. In the truly global firm, where multinationality is not just a label, traditional arrangements for strategic plans, corporate finance, and capital budgeting—which are still basically monocratic and unitary in nature—will gradually be revised. It is misleading to think, as so many corporate managers still do, that the continuing electronic and information technology revolutions will permit efficient global control from a single, geographically dis